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Beyond Irony: The Ul1l1amable's Appropriation of
its Critics in a Humorous Reading of the Text

Jennifer Jeffers
... lrulhs are illusions of which one has forgonen thai they ar~
illusions: worn-oul metnphors which have become powerless to
affect the senses: coins which have their obverst effaced and now

are no longer of account as coin~ bUI /llerl!ly as metal.
- Friedrich NietlSChc

In traditional Becken criticism, the most conventional interpretation of the
narrator's activil), in The Umwm(lble posits thai the namHive is aUempling
loeslablish "his" own self-identity but "[ hlis search for self-knowledge has
failed because it has produced only fiction" (Solomo n 83). Another variety
of this interpretation poses the Unnamablc's dilemma in Exislentiallanguage:
"&islence affirms merely that something is: essence denotes what it is ....
By the time we reach The Unnamable. the collapse of essence is virtually
complete: the voice is a mere existence crying out thai it exists" (Levy 104),
As DennisA, Foster argues in his Lacanian reading of The UIIIIQmable, which
includes an evaluation of the cri tical exegesis surrounding the text, the tradi·
tional critic produces an image of narrative authority and then, identifying
with thatlextual authority, (the crit ic) transfers and assumes me text':, struggles
as her own interpretative difficulties, In other words. the critic creates in her
reading a "coherent subjectivity" that allows herto "find in Beckett's works
that the difficulty. even impossibility. of telling a story make s his refusal to
lapse: into a despairing silence only further evidence of hi s heroic humanity.
makes Becken the paragon of modernist man" (Foster %), While traditional
critics have produced viable and certainly pedagogically practical readings
of the novel, Paul Sove. in 'The Image of the Creator in Beckeu 's Postmodem
Writing," has identified the difficulty in such writing : ", , , the fundamental

Modem aesthet ic liter-if), impulse ... simply does no! .....ork in a Postmodem
world . It is hope lessly out-of-date. It is di sclosed as merely anotherstrattgy
to reify and evade the: pain of contemporary ex.istence and not a positivt
creative response" (Bov~ 62). In this reification . the Humanist or traditionalist. accordi ng 10 Bovt "Modernist." perspective covers over diversity and
difference in an effonto make the "meani ng" of the text live up to a preconcei Ved . acceptable universal.
It is my contemion that Beckett's tex t can nm be adequately read for irony
by the Humanist or the Romantic critic. Th~ Unnamabfe always already es·
capes the confines of a traditional reading prod uced by the ironic critic who
auempt s to appropri.ue-reduco-Lhe tex t to a stable sense-making machine.
For Bec kett's text. following its own lines of escape. simpl y refuses to be'
rendered the exemplar of the reductive paradigm of a traditional concept of
irony. What we see occu r is that irony reduces the text to a "failure" concerning i15 sense-making capabilities, while it simultaneous ly allows the critic to
(ironically) "fai l" in her task of textual interpreter; in other words. Beckeu's
text "fail s," and so the cri tic's text must also "fail."lbe idea of post-modem
humor slips the noose of the "aesthetic of failure" by opening up textual
interpretation that permits the reader to enjoy the text without the burden of
representation and an aesthetic of universalized meaning. In order to be in a
position to read post-Humanist humor in The Unnamobk we must first peel
away two layers of critical residue that have been gradually deposited on lhe
text over time in Becken scho larship: o ne. that of stable irony. which promotes the Humanistic rationa l world view, and two, that of Romantic irony.
which exemplifies the quest for ide ntity.
One of the most common perspecti ves that critics adopt in their reading
of The Unnamabfe is a reading that interprets the text as an ironic narrative
discourse. In the Humanist literary tradition. reading for irony allows lhe
crilic Q priori the right to investigate the privileged concept of identity or the
self: "Irony has, since Plato. been indissociable from the problems of selfknowledge and of self-expressio n. alo ng with all the ontological and tpistemological questions attendant thereon" (Lang 37). Indeed. with Ihe example
of Socrates Western thought has plolted its points of intersection and divergence carefully on its ontolog ical and epistemological mappings : Socrates
may be ironic in relation to being and knowledge. but. in its interpretation or
Socrates. the West never allows Socrates to relinquish a foundational principle that renders them stable. In the history of ideas, the figure or Socrates is
the source for both a Humanist view of irony and the Romantic rendering of

irony. Humanist irony relies on an undi sguised correspondence between the
OOHaid and the said that is a reflection of Socrates denying he is wise (when
apparently he is wise). Romantic irony relies more o n an abstract form of
irony that is a counterpan to the so-caJled Socratic maxim. "Know thyself':
through a dialectical denial of the self. one negates and then affinns images
of the self in a seemingly ad injill i fllm process. But the first principle of the
process is the self which is founded upon a stable o nlology. and so. the pr0cess is finite .
80th of these fonns of irony have been empl oyed by critics in their readings ofOeckett. The first reading of irony is produced by the Humanist critic:
her reading of irony functions as a way to k.now her world in relation to
herself by showing herself both sides of her own statements. In relation to
the world. irony is a means to cha llenge and "adjust" the existing order. but
always with the fixed idea of the preservation and improvement of the exi5ting order. 'The second reading of iro ny is produced by the Romantic critic:
her reading of irony functi ons as a means to explore her world. which for the
Romantic is the subjective self. Each approach relies upon a traditional interpretation of Socratic irony that is characterized by "saying the opposite of
wllat you mean" and relies on a stable and overt reading of a texl. In other
words. the author has endowed the text with meaning--even if she has said
precisely the opposite of what she means-und the "smart" reader will un derstand the "said" to not be the meaning and the "not said" as the true meaning. For a traditional interpretation of Socratic irony. the power and beauty
of irony lie in the reader's clever malching of the opposite of what is said
with the meaning of what is not said.
Romantic irony may be read as a curious mixture of Humani st irony with
a more sophisticated irony that borders. at times. on postmodcm humor because it nirts ever so dangerously with the di ssolution of Ihe self. Romantic
irony's primary link with Humani st irony is that it functions in much the
same way as "saying the opposite of what you mean." The important difference. however. between Humanist irony and Romantic irony is that Romantic irony promotes an image of itself that is not c haracterized by stability:
Romantic irony tends to recoil from the material world into an abstract realm
that Kierkegaard so criticized in the German Romantics. According to
Kierkegaard. thi s posture in Romantici sm leads to a negative ironic retreat
on the part of the ironi st: 'The producing ego is the same as the produced
ego: 1=1 is the abstract identity. .. . But this infinity of thought in Fichte is
lilce every other Fichtian infinity. that is. a negati ve infi nity. an infinity with-

out finitude, an infinity void of a ll content" (Kierkegaard 290). Kierkegaard's
critique of the " negative infinity" of Fichte points to Kierkegaard's overall
problem with Hegeli an abstraction which, by its very nature, is unable 10
affect action in the empirical world. Instead, "void of all content," it univer·
salizes what it ca nnot empirically know and reduces all difference lOfllga/i".
if)' (non-bei ng). The Romantic's solipsism coupled with a sophisticaled ironic
recoili ng from the material world would seem to suggest an ideal interpretative stralegy with which to read The Unnamable. The Unnamable appears to
resemble the Romantic ironist in that the text "speaks" incessantly of "himself." break.ing this narrative impulse only to fabricate a story told in traditional representational form. Bul Romantic irony never truly leaves the realm
of meani ng or sense, no matte r how abstract it aspires to become because of
its stable ontologicaJ foundation.
Samuel Beckett begins The UnnamabJe with the questions: "Where now?
Who now? When now?" (Beckett 29 1), which are then supposedly answered
at the end of the text with a rambling four-page sentence that begins: '1'he
place, I' ll make it all the sa me . .. I'll make myself a memory . . . I'm flO( the
first. I won' t be the first, it will best me in the end ... " (4 11 ). The apparent
circularity of the tex t actually belies the impression o f a stable beginning and
e nd. If a circle has no beginning or e nd , there is no certain or stable point of
e ntry. It would seem that the narrati ve, then, may not actually begin at the
beginning and whether it does or not we have no way of knowing. We enter
the loop of narrative at the "begi nning" of the book but given this text we
cannot be positive that it is the beginning. The narrative refuses to give any
defi nite answers, as the tex t' s final words are ambiguous and open-ended:
" ... where I am, I don't know, I'll never know, in the silence you don 't know,
you mu st go on, I can't go on, I'll go on" (414).
The traditiona l reading of the end of (he novel reads the "voice's" "I'll go
on" in lenns of human subjectivity, and hence, as a brave humanist stance
that does not ninch in the face of the "void" of " nothingness." This view is
discussed by Wayne Booth, for example, in A Rhe/oric of Irony in relation to
The Umramab/e. Booth relates The Ulllrumab/e (0 the dire problem of "man"
in the "modem age": " ... (becausel many modem men have seen themselves
leeteri ng perilously on that borderline, unablc to be sure either that the universe is meaningless or that they can di sccrn any meaning, it is not surprising
that many poems and novels hover, as it were, between limited ironies and
the ultimate ironic denial" (Rhetoric 253). A limiled irony is. of course,ln
irony in which there is an explicit com::spondence between lhe nOl·said and

the said. " Ultimate ironic deniaJ." however, is a vague tenn Booth employs
for all types of literature that see m to manifest irony but do not evidence a
stable re lationship between overt and COvert meanings. Ironic denial is be yond "overt" irony and falls into Booth's category of"U nstab le-Covert-lnfinite" irony: this irony is of the obtu se variety: " ... many modem authors will
refuse even this degree of open dec laration. leaving us to infer the depths of
lheir ironies from superficial and del iberate ly ambiguous signs" (257).
Citing nearly the entire firsl page of the The Unnamable. Booth offers the
following summary of Beckett 's calculated "failure":
II would seem obvious that 10 attempt an interpretation of such
a passage is [0 invile ridicule. Beyond grammalicat analysis,
looking up ~pht!cljc and aporia, if nece.nary, or nOling lhe
stylistic devices imilating drin and despair, what can be said?
To find meaning where meaninglessness is asserted, to seek
an an of interpretation of a passage so clearly against interpretation is to risk appeari ng like one of Becken's own char·
acters. The passage seems to cha llenge every nOiion on which
this book is based, and indeed every concept of any kind. , , .
(258)

This passage is the prototypic enactmen t-"imitating drift and despair"---of
the "failure" or "impotence" syndrome that Dennis A. Foster atlributes to the
modernist critic. If Booth cannot read Beckett, it is because Beckett's text is
"so dearly against interpretation": if one ventures an interpretation one "risklsl
appeari ng like one of Beckeu's own characters." Booth's tex t. however, would
never be mistaken for one of Beckett 's texts Ilnl~ss Beckett decided 10 infiltrate the discourse of Booth's text- fo r Booth's text lacks the duplic ity that
characterizes Beckett's text. What is apparent is that Beckell's texts only
"fail" from a Human ist point of view, and this perspective never resists succumbing to its own se lf-i mposed theoretical cul-de-sac.
A Romantic read ing of Th~ Uwwmable wou ld read the text as one thai
continuously seeks stability all the while it decenters itself by refusing to
produce any fann of center or outer edge. The Romantic posture is one in
which irony see ms continually to move the subject being ironized farther
and farther away from the centered se lf; yet. the self is the contriver of this
sol ipsistic fantasy. and so. irony never goes beyond the se lf and never becomes anything e lse but the self-no maner how many disguises the ironist
dons. According to a Romantic reading of the Th~ U"namablt'. the text con-

tinuoui ly creates narrative strategies whereby it may move away from the
self. detach itself from its own narrative. whereas all the while it is in rIC:(
attempting to move toward the self, to attach or reattach to its own stable
identity. In other words, the text poses, postures and plays games with itself
in order to "know" itself more fully . If we were to enact a reading of the
novel as an example of Romantic irony. we would read for a1l oflhe ways in
which the se lf of the text seeks to know itself. This inability to come inao
self-knowledge is amplified by the text in its difficulty locating itself in time:
" 1 say years. though there are no years. What matter how long? Years isooe
of Bas il' s ideas. A short time. a long time it's all the same" (308·9). The
concept of time in the text is in fact completely discarded by the: narrative:
" Hell itself. ahhough eternal . dates from me revoll of Lucifer. It is therefort
permissible. in the light of this dis tant analogy, to think of myself as being
here forever. bUi not as having been here forever" (295-96). Since it is im·
possible to "date" the revolt of Lucifer. the text plays it "safe" by calling it
"eterna'" anyway: the lexl actuaJly dates itself in infinity because it refuses
to date itself at all. as "nol as having been here forever."n.e text contradicts
itself into a timelessness as the power of the "lie" indicates that the te,..;1 is not
able 10 render a plausible representatjon of a stable identity.
In a recent rereading of Romantic irony that includes a reading of Becten.
i rof!Y alld Eth ics if! Narralive. Gary J. Hand ..... erk attempts to revive Schltgtl
via Lacan in an effon to put forth an "ethical irony" that will produce I
responsible being in society. Nevertheless. the focus is still centered on the
solips istic se lf. although it has been renamed the "subject" and the searth is
for " identity" : " Ethical irony thus implies a holistic view of identity. a poss ible reintegration beyond incompatibles" (Handwerk 3). For HandweB..
irony's work and "force" is to "underm.ine the integrity of the subject itsoem/si
to imply exis ted. It attacks the notion of the subject as equivalenllo a COD·
sciou s intenlionality or a personal self-consciousness" (3). In regard 10
Bec ken . Handwerk wishes to show the ultimate breakdown oflhe "subjecland its connection to the " social gesture":
'Ille breakdown of the subject. seen in the fragmentation of
the narrative presence throughout Beckett's work, liberates
only althe cost of a heightened anxiety in the subject. Beckel!
forces us to confront the potential emptiness of the social geslure. the dislocation thai results from ironic abstraction detached from historica l groUnding. He returns us to the funda -

mt:ntal incohc:renciell that we cannot and dare not ignore for
100 long .. . , (17)

II would seem that Handwerk is merely reiterating in tenns of social consciousness the traditional concerns of the Romantic ironist: the self/subject.
Despite Handwerk's twentieth century Lacanian language, the currency of
his theoretical economy is still fund amentally Romantic. relying on the foundational principle of identity,
As we witnessed in our Romanti c reading of Th~ Unllomab/~ , the text
suuggles against the "fact" that it will never establish an origin or gain an
identity, This struggle is a parody of the Romantic quest; irony slips into
postmOdem humor, Even Handwerk 's updated Romantic irony cannot allow
a reading that "threatens to become infinite" (Elhics 191). In the same way,
Handwerk 's reading of How Ills (Becken's next nove l after Th~ Unnamablt!)
must stop the infinity of the text, and relies o n the narrato r of How /, Is to
Mrecount" the text for a final reading of identity, even if this identity is poly_
valent:
Closer examinalion reveals that what we really have here is a
triple·selved narralor. , , , The narrator is our last refuge of
mt:aning. Yet thai narrator's narrative reveals an insistent di vorce of the mental faculties, of the modes of selfbood, thai
corrodes the cenainty of the synthesizi ng power of subjective
consciousneu. , , . Becken here mows how the breakdown of
the subject is a functi on of the incoherence of language, o f tM
multiple, but not interdependent, ways of an.iculalion that con ·
stitute language. (187-88)

Yel, to first say that the text has a "triple·selved narrator" is to state that the
text is actually a schizophrenic sense'producing machine and not a stable
sense'producing identity-of-one. For spealcing of the "corrodeldj " "cen ainlY
ofLhe synthesizing power of subjective consciousness" and the "breakdown
oftbe subject" does not constitute a claim that s ubjectivity will rebound and
reconstitute the identity of a narrator. If anything, Handwerk's read ing of
Romantic irony in Beckett ironicall y points to the very impossibility of a
recuperation of the subjecl.
Thinking beyond irony is oUI first step toward a humorous interpretation
of The UntUlmable. Both of the traditional critics of irony that we have read
here write with the goal of translating Beckett's text into a meaningful. sense·
prodUCing discourse on topics privileged in their respective critical para-

di&ms. But the problem with Th~ Ullnamablt! and many of Beckett 's texIS is
that they do not " make sense" in what is traditionally accepted as " goodsenst
or "common sense"; it is for this reason that the traditional critic CInI'\()( lid·
equately rt!ad Beckett. Irony is translatable because it plays inside of the el·
isting language game-it follows the rules of representation and operItes
within the confines of "good sense." Humor, however. is that which plays on
the surface of significaLion before. or at the point of. sense or meaning. Gilles
Deleuze theorizes that we have passed beyond the order that privileges rtpre·
sentation and the individual- subjectivity being a pre -condition forboth trq.
cdy and irony. According to Deleuze, the transvaluation (to use Nietzsche's
term) has occurred and it is no longer possible to create texts that enact th!:
tragic and the ironk. That is not to say, however, that these texts have ceased
production: these texts, both literary and critical. continue to be produced
long after the de valuation of the economy of representation. 1l\e fOflnef or·
der " givel s ) way" to humor, which does not rely on representation and privi·
leges neither subjectivity nor objec tivity. for this new "sense" does nO( prion·
ti ze on a model of hierarchy or the Ideal :
H

TIle tragic and the ironic gi ve way to a new value. that ofhu·

mor. For if irony is the co-extensiveness of being with the indi vidual, or of the I with representation. humor is the co-exten·
sivellC5s of sen.§e with non ·sense. Humor is the art of the surfaces . nd of the doubles , of nomad singularities and of the
.lw.ys displ.ced aleatory poin! .... (Logic )41 )
In other words. irony is dependent upon a correspondence theory of language
whic h insures that the "not said" will always be identified by the reader because the "not said" is merely the negation of the " said ." As long as everyollt'
using a panicular language "agrees" that meaning lies lmdu the surface of
language then the correspondence or representational mode oflanguagefunc·
tions. Deleuze employs a metaphor of the horizontal to define humor. sense
moves on the surface of language . horizonlally in different directions. mani·
festing a rhizo matic discourse. The horizontal movement is opposed to . \·er·
tical movement downward that retrie ves the meaning Ilndunealh the signifi·
catio n. If it is the case. as Nietzsche suggests in the passage taken as oor
o pening epigram. that truths which we believe to lie underneath language art
actually " illusions of which one has forgotten thatlhey are illusions" (NieWche
180) -and this is always already the condition of language- then sense lies
on the surface of language be/orr the sense-making operation has taken pllCt.

in Deleuzian tenns. "se nse is not to be confused with s ignification" (Logic
51). In other words, s ignificatio n is ne utral. without negation or affirma.
tion-and uhramoral in the Nietzschean sense of beyond o r o utside moral
consideration. until a sense-making capability is imposed upon it and meaning rendered.
A humorous reading is possible when the "good" sense of truth and representation is no longer an acceptable c UlTe ncy- like Nietzsche ' s " ... coins
which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as coins
but merely as metal"-and non-sense sudde nl y appears in its place . In a humorous reading, "non-sense" is not lack of sense but merely a different sense
than what the order of representation recognizes as sense o r " good" sense .
Non-sense o r the absu rd are express ions used in existential ism or in "the
philosophy of the absurd" in which the sense they speak of is dependent
upon one stable rendering of sense. "good sense," but that one sense is lacking in the world; therefore. the existentialist mourns the absence of. loss o f.
the decline of or the "essential" deficiency o f sense in the world . A working
definition of Ikleuuan non-sense. on the o ther hand. would indica te the overabundance of sense in any given s igni fi cation . There is never too lillie sense.
there is always 100 muc h sense produced :

From the poim of view of the structure. 00 the contrary. there
is always 100 much sense: an excess produced and over-produced by non-sense as a lack of itsel r.... Likewise. non-sense
does nOl have any panicular sen'IC , bUI is oppo~e<l to the absence of sense rather than 10 the sense thaI it produces in e.ltcess-without ever maintaining with its product the !>imple
relation or e.ltclusion to which some people would like to re duce them. Noosense is that which has no sense. and that which .
as such and as it enacts the donalion of sense. is opposed 10
the absence of sense. (Logic 71)
We will see that the text of Th e Unnomable mimics the act of creation of
sense and in that enactment creates not sense in the realm of representation
or the "good" copy. but does not create non-sense in lenns of lack of sense .
either. The humorous texi mim ics the role of the ironist in o rder to create a
difJerrnl sense- in order to c reate difference--the difference between "good"
sense and a lac k of sense.
When too little sense is the problem. as posited generally by traditional
critics in their reading of The Unnamable. the n one can be certai n thai one is

caughl inside Ihe realm of represenlation; for representalion always insists
upon a faithful resemblance that does not offer. more th~n the original or
primary object. In order for a code of rep~nta~lon to eXist there must be I
primary object that is representable and the Identity of the represented object
is of paramount imponance. 11le concept of primacy insures that there is an
original identity-for the Platonists an Ideal or the original ldel-that the
"good" copy faithfully and accurately represents. Such a concept also lies
behind Weste rn culture's repression of difference: from phi losophical toeconomica!. political and cultural difference, as well as difference in teons of
racial. sexuaJ and religious alterity. If difference "escapes" the control of the
"good copy" the order is threatened, and when the order is threatened we
reven to re-telling the common siory of the West : "It is a question of assuring the triumph of the copies over simulacra. of repressing simulacra. keep""
ing them completely submerged. preventing them from Climbing to the sur·
face, and 'insinuating themselves' everywhere" (Logic 257). A certain amount
of discrepancy. however. steals into the good copy Mcause the simulacrum
is able 10 produce an '!fecI of the good copy. According to Oeleuze. even
"Plato discovers. in a flash of an inslan t, that the simulacrum is no! simply a
false copy. bUI that il places in question the very notations of copy and model"
(Logic 256). Indeed . Socrates cannot be differentiated from the sophisis. es·
pecially in Ihe early di alogues. Fonunately. "good sense" saves reprtsena·
tion and indeed we have built a tradition on "common" or "good" sense.
According to Deleuze. there is no originaJ identity, universal or model. only
copies (simu lacra) producing themselves in a non-hierarchical system ofdifFerence and singu larities.
In DiJflrrnct el rlpllilion, Deleuze employs a metaphor of the mm as a
way to depict the difference. the excess. between the representation ofidentity and the humorous enactment, or repetition. of that identity. I HUOlOf does
rt:-present the identity in terms of identity, but it ma.rk.r over the "original"
idenlity and in that masking. or repetition. creates Other. creates difference.
Foucault. commenting on Deleuzc's DiJJlrrnce el rlp/tition. cbaraclerius
aptly and succi nctly the role of "good" sense and difference in "the philosophy of representation":
Good sense is the world's most effective agent of division in
its recognitions. its establishment of equivalences. its sensitivity to gaps. its gauging of distances. as it assimilates and
separates. And it is good sense thai reigns in the philosophy of

representation. Let us pervert goOO sense and allow thought
to play outside the ordered table of resemblances: then it will
appear as the: vertical dimension of intensities. because intensity. well before its gradation by representation. is in itself
difference: difference that displaces and repeats itself. ... (Urn .
guose 183)

In our cuhure "good sense" has an undefeated record in its "establishment of
equivalences" and in its ability to "assimilate" and "separate": "good sense"
acts in thi s manner so that it may quickly close off the negotiation of
singularities and the negotiation of the space between singularitie5 which
constitute difference. Language is not simply a si&n for truth. signification
evobng "good sense" as the vertica l model of language posits. but a code of
signification that must be rendered meaningful. It is the aCI of renderingthe negotiation of singularities and the space between the si ngularities-that
creates or produces meaning. Therefore, if we could "pe rvert good sense and
allow thought to play outside the o rdered table of resemblances." then . as
Foucault suggests. we could perceive the structure (of represen tation) that
manipulates our perspective in such a manner that we always already think
and see in tenns of order. gradation and recognition : " it will then appear as
the: vertical dimension of intensities. because intensity. well before its gradation by representation. is in itself difference."
Reading against. though not in opposition to the tradition, we see that
humor has stolen into a text when the language no longe r re-presents the
"good" copy of the Idea o r original. but presents instead the "bad" copy or
simulacrum. Humor enacts representation from an "inauthentic" posilionfor humor does not wish to produce the "good" copy or valid good sensebut pnxluces difference and Othu sense not based on the foundation of reprtStntation. The Unnamable perverts the traditional concept of representation and meaning through a fastidiously accurate parodying of the ironic
search for identity and knowledge, just as Deleuze's Sacher-Masoch perverts the law through a precisely controlled adherence to the letter of the law.
1be enactment of humor presents a subtle and surreptitious repetition of the
category of representalion: making the gesture of resemblance in the very
ICt of discrediting and di smantling the representational order. This movement. of course. is not naive ly conceived and we should keep in mind that
there is an "element of contempt in the submission" to representation and
that the texi's "apparent obedience conceals a criticism and a provocation"

(Dele uze, Sachu-Masoch 77), Similar to the enemy infiltrating the mililary
headquaners, humo r le t loose in the realm of represen tation spells the eventual loss of power o r eve n the downfall of the reg ime. Funhermore, even the
.fuspicio" that the Un namable is playing the role of pretender to the throne or
representatio n in a humorous e nac tment of traditional irony puts into ques·
tion the very idea of the feasibi lity of representation. For the "rumor" that
the ene my could infiltrate a nd dismantle the power structure, in thi s instance
irony and the epistemo logy that informs it, casts enough doubt on the struc·
ture to weaken its credibility.
To return to T" ~ Ufl1UlmabJ~. one of the most e vident aspects ofme text is
the Un namable 's acknow ledgment of reiterati ng the words, the codes, and
epistemology of the tradition. The te;llt admits the infi ltration of'1heir voices."
their system of language and the ir hierarchy of ideas into its own signifiC.1tion : "They've blown me up with their voices, like a balloon, and even as I
collapse, it's them I hear.... the little murmur of unconsenti ng man, to
murmur what it is their humanity stifles .... I won 'l say it, I can 'l say it, l
have no language but theirs ..... (325). The Un namable is not nai \'e con·
cerning the fact thai the system has in filtrated its text, nor is it naive in rela·
tion 10 its own ability to produce a lex!: this text, any text, is always already
a product of an over-dc temlined culture whose sole mark of distinction is il5
vast. yet simple, abilily to mo nitor difference. To acknowledge that ''They'\'e
blown me up wilh the ir voices. like a balloon," is to be aware that one must
operate in the system. according to the system, knowing that to openlychillenge the system will put an end to o ne's ability to speak . With this knowledge, then. the Unnamable could choose 10 be '·silent." and the text speaks
ofte n of going sile nt: or, with this kno wledge, the text could repeat the tradi·
tio n. it could mimi c the lang uage it has been taught not in an effort to pr0duce resemblance. but in order 10 produce humor.
A humorous interpretation of the text recognizes the slippage in the text's
stories. The slippage is the space, or as Foucault phrases it. the "non-place,"
that opens up between "good se nse" and non ~ sense or different sense. The
Unnamable e;llists in the opening. the " no n-place:' between sense and non·
sense and in this way. the text exposes a double logic: the logic with which
we read and affirm representati on is the very same logic with which we read
and affirm di ffere nce. In other words. the very logic that upholds the repre·
sentational order is the same logic that will deconstruct that order. The logic
of the text that says it lacks sense-all the while operating under the guises

of "good" sense-is lhe same logic thaI produces a humorous reading by
producing 100 much sense:
At no molN:ntdo I know what I'm tAlking about, oor of whom,
nor of where, nor how, nor why, but I could employ fift),
wretches for this sinister operation and still be shon of a fifty.
first. to close the circu it, that I"now, without "no..... ing what it
means . ... Nothing to do but stretch OU I comfortably on the
rtd. in the blissful "nowledgc you are nobody for all ctcr.
nity. .. . I knew it, there might be a hundred of u~ and still
wc'd lac" thc hundred and first. we'll always be shon of me.
(338-39)

In the text's double movement, it plays at onc level the ironist who has the
"mowledge you are nobody for all eternity" all the while it "haws" it is the
subjectively important writer of this text. At another level, it is the humorist
who in this claim merely repeats what cannot be represented, that there is no
wly to reach a "knowledge you are nobody for all eternity" and yellhe mimicking of the master's voice produces an odd se nse: of si ncerity. In the claim
that the text "could employ tifty wretches" but "still be s hort of a fifty-first,"
then "a hundred" but "lack the hundred and first," is a repetition that produces an excess of meaning. No matter how many dupes may be "employed"
by the text. the text will always have mor~ than it needs. "an excess produced
and over-produced by nonsense as a lack of itself' (Logic 71). For the claim .
itself, does not lack sense: rather "it enacts the donation of sense" in the
movement of the "bad" copy of representation, and it is this movement. thiOi
surreptitious enactment. that produces humor and undennines the "good"
sense of representation, When the authority of order of represen tation is
usurped by repetition. then the "bad" copy-the simulacrum that does not
correspond to the so-called. original-produces difference and difference generates multiplicities unheeded. Therefore, no mailer how many wretche~ are
employed there is no way "to close the circuit," no way to stop proliferation
of difference once the order of representation has been infiltrated by the "bad"
copy.
TIle text's narrative is most "be lievable," and hence mOSt subversive, when
it makes the meta-narrative move of di stinguis hing itself from the "stories"
that it creates. The traditionalist reads irony in thi s move as the distinction
between "self' and the stories that the narrative creates in order to come into
"self-knowledge" or in order to "go on." The text makes this distinction doz-

ens of times during the course o f its narrative : " But who are these manUcs
let loose on me from o n hi g h for what they call my good, let us first try IIId
throw a lillie ligh t on thaI. To tell the truth-no, first tbe story" (326). T'bt
"maniacs" or "trOOp of lunatics" are, of course. the so-called narratonMurphy. Watt. Molloy, Malone , Mahood. Wonn- that the text claims 1Ob.a\'(
crealed al some poi nt in its " narrati ve life." Yel , the very idea thai one could
differenti ate hierarchically between the " truth" concerning the different n.'.
rSlors lind the story "- no, first the sto ry"-sho uld be a clue for the reader 0(
the text concern ing the texl's ab ility 10 forget that truth is merely an "illu,
sion" or a "worn-ou l metaphor," From the perspeclive o f representation "'(
recognize that Ihe story 's "conlent" is unlikely to be "true"; but what we do
assume 10 be true is thai the lang uage of the lext will be "lrue",o lbe idea of
"good" sense, BOl slippage occurs because the texl does not forget and it
does nOI challenge. In its complic ity wi th the tradition. it makes tbc: sUm
movemenl of repetition, for the text is well aware that it is masking over~
ability to fa ithfull y re- present a "good" copy : " Did they ever get Mahood to
speak? It seems to me not. I think Murphy spoke now and then. the others
100 perhaps, I don ' I remember. but il was clumsily do ne. you could sec the
ventri loquist" (348) . Indeed, the ve ntriloquist both speaks and does IlOl
speak--<1iv idi ng sense, yet creating "too much" sense, and creating adoubk
logic where all things a nd no things make "good" sense. The double logic
moves in such a way that the Un namable places the order of rtpre.sentatioa
under suspicion through its own move to appropriate "their" words:
NOl lo be able to open my mouth without proclaiminglhem.
and our fe llowship, Ihal's what lhey imagine Ihey'll have me

reduced 10, II 's a poor trick that consists in ramming a set of
words down your gullet on the principle that you can 'I bring
them up wi lhout being branded as belonging 10 their breed.
8uIl'II fix their gibberish for them, I never understood a won!
of it in any case. not a word of tne stories il spews, like gobbe15
of vomit. My inabi lity 10 absorb. my genius for forlelling. art
more than they reckoned with, Dear incomprehension. it's
thanks 10 you I'll be mysdf, in the end. Nothing will remain
of all the lies they have glulled me with. And I' ll be myself at
lasl. as a slarv ling belches his odourless wind. before the bliss
of coma, .. . (324-25)
Although one may be tempted 10 read "ramming a set of words p'll
your gullet on the pri nc iple that you can' t bring the m up without being br1Ddcd

as belonging to their breed" as mere irony-as mere railing against the established order-it would seem that in this instance humor has the upper
hand and is parodying the style and sentiment of irony to point toward a
deeper and more fundamental problem: the inability to represent the Western tradition in any other manner than through parody. The accusation of
"the lies they have glutted me with" is not read as irony on the part of the
humanist ironic critics. In fact. as we have seen, the stalement would not be
"read" at all . The "lies" must be suppressed by the order because when one
"lies" one in effect produces "bad" copies, or simu lacra which proliferate
unheeded. leading us ever farther and farther away from the "Truth," When
a narrative bases its entire narrative pn:x1uction on "lies," the Western Lnldition cannot accept it. cannot read it. and cannot see its own renection in the
image presented in the accusation.
What the traditional readership reads as the delightfully playful element
in The Unnamab/~-the teltt's irony and irascibility-is often the point at
which the Unnamable is at its most subversive. For example, the text begins
by appearing ironic about almost everything it comments upon; a critic of
irony, Booth or Handwerk. could have picked up on the extremely ironic
and cri ticaJ tone at the beginning of the novel:
Why did I have myself represented in the midst of men. the
light of day? II seems to me it was none of my doing. We
won't go inlo Ihat now, I can see them still. my delegates.
The things they have told me! About men. the light of day. I
refused to believe them. But some of it hIlS stock . ... Innate
knowledge of my mother, for example. is Ihal conceivable?
NO( for me, She was one of their favourite subjects, of con·
versation. They also gave me the low-down on God. They
laid me I depended on him, in the lasl analysis .... I remem·
ber liule or nothing or lhese leclures. I cannol have underslood a great deal. But I seem to have retained cenain descriptions. in spite of myself. They gave me courses on love,
on intelligence. most precious, most precious. Some of this
rubbish has come in handy on occasions, I don't deny it, on
occasions which would never have arisen if they had left me
in peace. I use it still,to scratch my arse with. , .. (297·98)

Let us here brieny reinsert the ironic readings in the midst of our humorous
reading, for me purpose of witnessing the surreptitious movement of humor
as it glides ineffably across the surface of the text. For Booth. mis passage

gives ample reference to ~e material. world. representing the major tenets 0(
a civilized and even a loving Human ism: knowledge. the maternal. God and
love. Even bener. the Unnamable of the text seems to be deriding them in an
ironic manner: saying one thing but meaning the opposite. Although the
Unnamable may be critical of the Western tradition, "he" would never COrtIpletely denounce it; instead. the Unnamabl~ crilici.zes experience au way 0(
pointing out its discrepancies and, hence, Improvmg the system. According
to the Humanist reading . the Unnamable definitely "plays within" the power
structure.
For a critic sympathetic to Handwerk's project. this passage once again
affords a reading of irony that is more sophisticated than the Humanist's
reading. In this passage we see the Unnamable shifting "his" roles and don·
ning a new facade when it pleases "him." The text seems to double bId 00
itself: ;'J cannot have understood a great deal," then "[bJut I seem to bave
retained certain descriptions. in spite of myself." Though there is irony in the
text's relIScting. in part. its first statement. the irony for the Romantic critic is
contained in the fact that the "person" in the text, the pseudo Romantic. is
suspended above this entire discourse watching "himselr' shift into one mode
of irony ("Some of this rubbish has come in handy on occasions. I don't deny
il. on occasions which would never have arisen if they had left me in peace1,
then shift into yet another mode as the paragraph ends ("No no, here I am in
safety, amusing myself wondering who can have dealt me these insigniflCllll
wounds") . According to the Romantic reading, the Unnamable wants to com·
plain about the fact that "the inestimable gift of life had been rammed dm\1I
my gullet" (298). then tum back to a position of amusement and nonchalance
by "wondering who can have deah me these insignificant wounds."
From the point of view of humor, the above passage immediately puts
into question the politics of representation: "Why did I have myself tepftsented in the midst of men, the light of day?" The UnnamabJe responds that
" Ii It seems to me it was none of my doing," which is only partially thee8$(.
The structure that affinns representation never gives one the opportunity to
choose if one would like to be "represented." The Unnamable is fully aware
that it is completely inscribed by the structure lhat constitutes representation.
an~ so. the text seems to be up to some sort of game playing or parodyinglhat
pomts to a more profound reason for its perversion. If we recall that Deleuzc's
Sacher-Masoch in order to pervert the law and push it to its "furtherest con·
sequences"-punishment--obeyed the law to the most extreme detail. then
perhaps we can see that the Unnamable. too. plays Mnsoch in its effon 10

perven and push to its "funherest consequences" the traditional ironic rendering of the texl. When the Unnnmnble states thnl "I seem to have retained
certain descriptions, in spite of myself." it i~ not being ironic; for the words
that uphold the tradition are the very words that precipitate ils downfall. 1'l1e
Unnamable has "retained certain descriptions" panly because it knows that
it cannot escape "proclaiming them" even if it were to allempt to denounce
them and ''the ir breed." The Un namable also has "retained certain descrip·
tions'· so that it may "fix their gibberish for them ," so that it may produce the
"bad" copy, and so that il may unravel "good" sense through the very enactmen! of the order of representation . If punishment is the delight of Masoch,
then playing outside of the restricted category of lIoense in an effort to effect
the collapse of the tradition is the delight of Ihe Unnamable
Movement to effect this collapse is e vident in the expo"e of anot her '·car·
rot" that never fails to arouse great admiration on the part of the Humanillol,
that is, the ontological search for origins founded on a pnnclple of non-being-based on an entirely abstract concept of negauon-an ontology that
reduces all difference into a category of non -belllg. The Unnamable humorously introduces the topic of ontology into its narrative of identity when it
proffers: "First I'll say what l"m no\, that's how they taught me to proceed,
then what I am ..... (326). Employing the Hegelian dialeetic the Un namable
·'proceeds" 10 nam~ itself against those il believes itself not to be: "I am
neilher, I needn't say, Murphy, nor Wall, nor Mercier, nor-no, I can't even
bring myself to name them ... "(326). Of course, the naming in this passage,
simi lar to so many other passages in the le)!.t , results in the narrative remaining unnamablt. This game of naming the un namable works 3gnin~tthe tradl·
tion-for the system is unable to name because of it .. own principle of negation. However, the problem that the Unnamable pre~nts in reading lo r the
name (identity) in the tradition of negative olllolog} is thnt it. the Un namable,
will never be named all the while il has II name : the Unnamable_
This situation depicts Deleuze's definition of parado)!.. ··Good ~ense af·
firms that in alt things there is a detenninable sense or dlre<:lIon C\t'fu): but
paradox is the affirmation of both seases or direl:tlOns at the ,arne 111m"
(Logic I); also purndoxes "always have the characteristic o f going In both
directions at once, and of rendering identificat ion impos"lble
" (Logic
75). As the texl affirms two directions of sense o;imultaneou:-.ly, II affirms the
production of simulacra that muhiply heedless of the model Without the
ability 10 recuperate identity, the text constitutes difference--lhe on ly unaccountable entity in any system of totalization . Playing on the system that

tries to envelop it, the Unnamable humorously covers overthc: lnIdition.clocbing i, with its own "execration and disbelief' :
There is no use denying, flO usc twping on the same old lIlina
J !.;now so well. and so easy to say. and which simply amounts
in the end 10 speaking yel .,ain in the way they inLCnd me 10
speak.. that is say about them, even with execration and disbe.
lief. Perhaps they exist in the way they have ~ will be
mine , it's possible. I don't know and I'm not interested. If
they had taught me how 10 wish I'd wish they did. There', no
getti ng rid of them without naming them and their coolrlplions, that's the thing to keep in mind. (326)
Grid-iocked-"'Ilhere's no gelling rid of them without naming them and
their con traptions"--the text names (that is, pl ays in the existing language
game). but does not promote clarification. identity o r verify the ontokltY of
non-being, but divides "good" sense and produces a humorous readin, _
"speaki ng yet again in the way they intend me to speak."
Lastly, the novel's concluding sentence might be Il parody ofme pmp
of the brave Human ist's struggle to "go o n" no matter how pointless ",oioc
o n" seems: " ... the words Utat remain, myoid story, which I've forgOtlcl ...
where I am, l don't know, I' ll never know, in the silence you don't know.)'OI
must go on , I can ', go on, I' ll go on" (4 13- 14). The more traditional readi:a&
interprets this passage in one of two ways: either in terms of the Sisyphus
complex- goi ng on in life, persevering despite all odds: or in leOllS oftbe
incessant "munnuri ng"- goi ng on in language, persevering in spilt oflbe
"si lence." Usually these two readings are intertwined. Out of these readinp
also arises the aesthetic of failure that gloomily holds onto its reductiveCU"
ner of critical exegesis-never "failing" to render Beckett 's texts in terms"
impotence and negativity. Yet, as we have come to understand. tbescre»
ings. limited by their epistemological and interpretative biases, rarely MM
the text. Humor. o n the o ther ha nd, initiates a reading-this present readiJrc
functions primarily as a departure point for future readings-lhat allows for
multiplicity and liberates The Umramable from the crilicaJ appropriatioa II
which it has been inscribed.

Emory Un;\'ersiry
Atlatrla, Georgia

Notes
Sec Gilles Oc:leu1.t, DiJfl"ncr n rip/filum 29: "Panout c'esl Ie masque. c' est Ie '!lIVestl,
e'esc Ie v~IU. II v~n't! du nu. C't'S1 II." muquc, Ie v~rillble sujel de III rijXllllOO C"csl
pal« que II repelilK>n diftere en nature de I. rcprc!sentanoo. que Ie rfptct nc peul t! u~
n:prtscnlc!. RUlis dolll00joun; tlre signlfi!!. masqut par ce qUI Ie slgnlric:, I1\llSqUJI"I JUImo!me cc qu'jI ~ilnific . "
(,"E,et)'whcrc: Inc m:lst. the di sguise. the cmenng is the truth of the uncO\'ered [nakedl.
I! IS the OInk which is the true subject of fepclilion II 15 bec.usc repetillon dllrcrs In kmd
lin nalUre[ from repetition. thaI what IS repelled ("II01lU1 Ix rcpresc.'nled. but II muslal ....·.)'5 be sig nified. masked by what signifies 11. llse]f maskm, what il sigmfies" My
Lnnslallon.j
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